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OCASIO v. UNITED STATES: WHY THE HOBBS ACT 
PUNISHES CO-CONSPIRATOR EXTORTION 
JOSHUA T. CARBACK∗ 
State and local corruption is a national problem.1  Over the past four 
decades, the United States Department of Justice increased its efforts to 
combat political corruption by using a variety of statutory tools, the most 
important of which is the Hobbs Act.2  Since the passage of the Hobbs Act, 
the United States Supreme Court has broadened its interpretation of the 
statute in response to prosecutorial innovation aimed at combatting political 
corruption.3  Ocasio v. United States4 presents a case of great importance to 
the Supreme Court’s Hobbs Act jurisprudence.5  The case concerns 
defendant Samuel L. Ocasio, a Baltimore police officer convicted of 
violating the Hobbs Act by engaging in a kickback scheme.6  The issue 
currently on appeal before the Supreme Court is whether the Hobbs Act’s 
anti-extortion provision, under which Ocasio was convicted, contemplates 
acts directed against co-conspirators, or merely third parties outside of 
criminal conspiracies.7  The text of the Hobbs Act, its legislative history, 
and strong public policy considerations all support a broad construction of 
its anti-extortion provision as encompassing co-conspirator extortion.8  
Therefore, the Supreme Court should affirm the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit’s decision, uphold Ocasio’s conviction, and 
preserve the Justice Department’s ability to fight extortion of co-
conspirators with the Hobbs Act.9 
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 1.  Public Corruption: Why It’s Our #1 Criminal Priority, FBI (Mar. 26, 2010), 
https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2010/march/corruption_032610.  As Federal Bureau of 
Investigation Public Corruption/Civil Rights Program Assistant Section Chief Patrick Bohrer 
explains, public corruption is the agency’s primary investigative priority: the agency investigates a 
gamut of activities including, “extortion, embezzlement, racketeering, kickbacks, and money 
laundering, as well as wire, mail, bank, and tax fraud.”  Id.  
 2.  18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (2012); see infra Part II.  
 3.  See infra Part II.  
 4.  750 F.3d 399 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 5.  See infra Parts II–IV.  
 6.  See infra Part I.  
 7.  See infra Part III.  
 8.  See infra Part IV.  
 9.  See infra Part V.  
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I.  THE CASE 
The extensive investigative efforts of the Baltimore Police Department 
(“BPD”) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) resulted in the 
prosecution of defendant Samuel L. Ocasio in Ocasio v. United States.10  
The BPD began its investigation in the summer of 2009, and the FBI joined 
the investigation in 2010.11  At the time the FBI became involved, the BPD 
had identified fifty officers as possibly being involved in a conspiracy to 
accept payoffs in exchange for referring persons in car wrecks to a local 
vehicle repair business—Majestic Car Repair LLC (“MCR”).12  Majestic 
Car Repair LLC was co-owned and operated by brothers Herman Alexis 
Moreno and Edwin Javier Mejia.13  During the winter of 2010, the FBI 
placed a wiretap on Moreno’s telephone, and initiated surveillance of MCR 
and Moreno’s private residence.14  From November 2010 to February 2011, 
the FBI recorded thousands of phone calls between Moreno and various 
BPD officers, including Ocasio.15  The scheme between members of the 
BPD and MCR consisted of BPD officers referring persons with wrecked 
vehicles to MCR for repair in exchange for receiving payments from the 
repair shop ranging from $150 to $350 per vehicle.16  Knowledge of the 
“kickback”17 extortion scheme spread by word-of-mouth throughout the 
BPD; consequently, the scheme metastasized.18 
On March 9, 2011, Ocasio and ten co-defendants were indicted in the 
United States District Court for the District of Maryland on a single count 
of conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. Section 371,19 a violation of the Hobbs Act 
                                                          
 10.  Ocasio v. United States, 750 F.3d 399, 403 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 11.  Id.   
 12.  Id.  
 13.  Id.  
 14.  Id.  
 15.  Id.  
 16.  Id.  
 17.  Kickbacks are defined as follows:  
Probably the most common form of corruption after bribery is the “kickback.”  
Traditionally, a kickback involved an employee receiving a salary, part of which he 
returned or “kicked back” in cash to his employer . . . .  Currently, however, kickbacks 
most often involve purchase contracts rather than employment contracts, and a 
kickback could now be defined as an extra charge which a vendor adds to the price of 
an item sold to a government agency, that the vendor later gives or “kicks” back to the 
government purchasing agent or other official in his personal capacity, either in cash or 
in kind. 
John R. Hailman, Corruption in Government Contracts: Bribery, Kickbacks, Bid-Rigging and the 
Rest, in U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL DIVISION, PROSECUTION OF PUBLIC CORRUPTION 
CASES 15, 21 (1988), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/110010-110033NCJRS.pdf.  
 18.  Ocasio, 750 F.3d at 403.  
 19.  18 U.S.C. § 371 (2012).  Section 371 reads, in pertinent part:  
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(“the Act”).20  On October 19, 2011, the grand jury returned a seven-count 
superseding indictment charging Ocasio.21  Count One of the superseding 
indictment named Ocasio for conspiring to violate the Hobbs Act for 
engaging in the kickback-for-referral scheme.22  A jury found Ocasio guilty 
on all charges against him: conspiring to commit Hobbs Act extortion and 
three other counts of Hobbs Act extortion.23  On June 1, 2012, the district 
court judge sentenced Ocasio to eighteen months in prison, followed by 
three years of supervised release. 
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit addressed whether the Count One 
conviction was fatally flawed in light of Ocasio’s theory that conspiring to 
extort property from one’s own co-conspirator does not contravene federal 
law.24  The Fourth Circuit ultimately affirmed the district court, following 
its precedent in United States v. Spitler,25 in ruling that bribe-payers’ active 
participation in schemes constitute co-conspirator extortion criminalized by 
the Hobbs Act.26  The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the 
scope of the Hobbs Act term “another,” relative to co-conspirators.27  In 
making its decision, the Court will apply fundamental principles of 
                                                          
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United States, 
or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose, 
and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each 
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.  If, 
however, the offense, the commission of which is the object of the conspiracy, is a 
misdemeanor only, the punishment for such conspiracy shall not exceed the maximum 
punishment provided for such misdemeanor. 
Id. 
 20.  Ocasio, 750 F.3d at 401.  The Hobbs Act reads, in pertinent part:  
(a) Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the 
movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or 
attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any person 
or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section 
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both. 
(b) As used in this section— 
. . . . 
(2)  The term “extortion” means the obtaining of property from another, with his 
consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or 
under color of official right. 
18 U.S.C. § 1951(a)–(b) (2012).  
 21.  Ocasio, 750 F.3d at 402.   
 22.  Id.  
 23.  Id.   
 24.  Id. at 408.  The second issue, not on appeal before the Supreme Court, was whether the 
district court abused its discretion in compelling Ocasio to provide restitution for one of Ocasio’s 
kickback offenses.  Id. at 412.  
 25.  800 F.2d 1267 (4th Cir. 1986). 
 26.  Ocasio, 750 F.3 at 411.  
 27.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Ocasio v. United States, No. 14-361 (Sept. 25, 2014) 
[hereinafter Petition]. 
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statutory interpretation in consulting the text of the statute and its legislative 
history, while also being mindful of the policy implications of its ruling.28 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The Hobbs Act was originally passed to combat crimes of extortion 
and robbery committed by labor unions.29  In drafting the Act, Congress 
looked to New York law for guidance in defining the crimes of extortion 
and robbery.30  Since the Act came into force, the scope of what constitutes 
extortion has expanded in two significant ways.  First, the Act’s definition 
of extortion has been interpreted disjunctively in order to encompass public 
officials soliciting illicit payments without the threat of violence, force, or 
fear.31  Second, judicial construction of the Hobbs Act has also extended so 
far as to eliminate inducement as an element of extortion—a conspirator 
now only need receive compensation to be liable for Hobbs Act extortion.32  
There is currently a circuit split stemming from disagreement as to whether 
the Hobbs Act term “another” contemplates criminal co-conspirators.33  In 
resolving this split, the Court will apply conventional methods of statutory 
interpretation in first consulting the text of the Hobbs Act to derive its plain 
meaning, and if that analysis does not resolve the case on its own, by 
examining the Act’s legislative history as well.34 
A.  The Legislative History of the Hobbs Act 
The framers of the Hobbs Act drafted the statute with the intention of 
supplanting the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Copeland Anti-
Racketeering Act of 1934.35  The purpose of the Hobbs Act was to combat 
union violence affecting interstate commerce in the form of extortion and 
robberies.36  The framers drafted the Act’s language to imitate the 
definitions of those crimes in New York law, since labor union racketeering 
was prevalent in New York.37 
                                                          
 28.  See infra Part II.D. 
 29.  See infra Part II.A.  
 30.  See infra Part II.A. 
 31.  See infra Part II.B. 
 32.  See infra Part II.B.  
 33.  See infra Part II.C. 
 34.  See infra Part II.D. 
 35.  See infra Part II.B.1. 
 36.  See infra Part II.B.1.  
 37.  See 1942 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. 16–19 (listing several instances of racketeering crimes 
occurring in New York). 
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1.  The Hobbs Act Supplanted the Supreme Court’s Interpretation 
of the Anti-Racketeering Act 
The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) originally prosecuted racketeering 
crimes under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890.38  The Copeland Anti-
Racketeering Act of 193439 (“Anti-Racketeering Act”) was implemented to 
more effectively suppress racketeering.40  In United States v. Local 807 of 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters,41 the Supreme Court reviewed a 
case involving charges levied against Teamsters for violating the Anti-
Racketeering Act.42  Specifically, the Teamsters were charged with 
conspiring to use and using violence and threats to obtain payments 
equivalent to union dues from owners of “over-the-road’43 trucks entering 
New York City.44  The Court considered whether members of labor unions 
could be charged with conspiracy under the Anti-Racketeering Act.45  The 
                                                          
 38.  Sherman Anti-Trust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 1–7 (2012)); see also Investigation of So-Called “Rackets”: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of 
the Comm. on Commerce, 73d Cong. 1 (1933) [hereinafter Investigation of So-Called “Rackets”] 
(statement of Sen. Royal S. Copeland, Chairman, S. Comm. on Commerce) (“The cost of crime is 
steadily advancing.  Conservative students of the subject place the levy at varying amounts, even 
as high as 13 billions of dollars annually.”).   
 39.  Copeland Anti-Racketeering Act, ch. 569, § 2, 48 Stat. 979–80 (1934) (originally 
proposed as S. 2248, 73d Cong. (1934)). 
 40.  See Investigation of So Called “Rackets,” supra note 38, at 17 (statement of James S. 
Bolan, Comm’r of New York) (“The records show that the police have been unable to apprehend 
in most cases those involved in rackets, because the trouble is in getting them speedily convicted, 
and after they are convicted to be certain that they receive swift and sure punishment and that they 
will remain in prison after they get there.”).   
 41.  315 U.S. 521 (1942).  
 42.  Copeland Anti-Racketeering Act, § 2.  The Act provides, in pertinent part:  
Any person who, in connection with or in relation to any act in any way or in any 
degree affecting trade or commerce or any article or commodity moving or about to 
move in trade or commerce— 
(a) Obtains or attempts to obtain, by the use of or attempt to use or threat to use force, 
violence, or coercion, the payment of money or other valuable considerations, or the 
purchase or rental of property or protective services, not including, however, the 
payment of wages by a bona-fide employer to a bona-fide employee; or 
(b) Obtains the property of another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of force 
or fear, or under color of official right; or 
(c) Commits or threatens to commit an act of physical violence or physical injury to a 
person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to violate sections (a) or (b); or 
(d) Conspires or acts concertedly with any other person or persons to commit any of the 
foregoing acts; shall, upon conviction thereof, be guilty of a felony and shall be 
punished by imprisonment from one to ten years or by a fine of $10,000, or both. 
Id.  
 43.  The term encompasses trucks “of, for, or pertaining to transportation on public 
highways.”  Over-the-road, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/over-the-
road?s=t (last visited Mar. 11, 2016).  
 44.   Local 807, 315 U.S. at 526.   
 45.  Id. at 527–28.   
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Court concluded that the Act did not encompass members of labor unions.46  
Congress reacted to the Supreme Court’s decision by attempting, but 
failing, to pass legislation to amend the Anti-Racketeering Act in 1942 and 
1943.47  Congress finally succeeded, in passing the Hobbs Act in 1945, out 
of a desire to supplant the Supreme Court’s ruling in Local 807 and to 
combat the extortive activities of all persons, including members of labor 
unions.48 
2.  Hobbs Act Terms Imitate Analog Terms in New York Laws 
The crimes of robbery and extortion, as defined in the Hobbs Act, 
were specifically drafted to imitate the definitions for those crimes 
articulated in New York Penal Code of 1909 (“Penal Code”).49  The Penal 
Code defined “extortion” as “the obtaining of property from another, with 
his consent, induced by a wrongful use of force or fear, or under color of 
official right.”50  The Penal Code defined “robbery” as: 
the unlawful taking of personal property, from the person or in 
the presence of another, against his will, by means of force, or 
violence, or fear of injury, immediate or future, to his person or 
property, or the person or property of a relative or member of his 
family, or of any one in his company at the time of the robbery.51 
The Penal Code was drafted to imitate the Field Code, a nineteenth-century 
model code.52 
                                                          
 46.  Id. at 535.  
 47.  S. 2347, 77th Cong. (1942); H.R. 6872, 77th Cong. (1942); H.R. 7067, 77th Cong. 
(1942); H.R. 653, 78th Cong. (1943). 
 48.  H.R. 32, 79th Cong. (1945); see also 91 CONG. REC. 11,900 (1945) (statement of Rep. 
Hancock) (stating that the Supreme Court’s opinion in Local 807 was “a plain invitation to 
Congress to enact an amendment such as the Hobbs bill, in which the word ‘whoever’ would 
remove all question that Antiracketeering Act personalities are meant to apply to all persons, 
including union officers or members, if they practice robbery or extortion”).  
 49.  See 91 CONG. REC. 11,900 (1945) (statement of Rep. Hancock) (“The bill contains 
definitions of robbery and extortion which follow the definitions contained in the laws of the State 
of New York.  It would change no State statutes, but the Supreme Court decision, if allowed to 
stand, might affect State courts in construing those laws.”); see also id. at 11,906 (statement of 
Rep. Robsion) (“The word ‘extortion’ as defined in this bill means the obtaining of property from 
another with his consent but induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force or violence or 
fear.  The definitions of robbery and extortion set out in this bill are the same definitions set out in 
the New York State code of laws and are defined in substantially the same way by the laws of 
every State in the Union.”); id. at 11,900 (statement of Rep. Hobbs) (“The definitions in this bill 
are copied from the New York Code substantially.”).  
 50.  N.Y. PENAL LAW § 850 (Consol. 1909).  
 51.  Id. § 2120. 
 52.  See 4 COMM’RS OF THE CODE, THE PENAL CODE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK § 613 
(Lawbook Exchange, Ltd., 1998) (1865) (“Extortion is the obtaining of property from another, 
with his consent, induced by a wrongful use of force or fear, or under color of official right.”). 
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After the Hobbs Act came into force, several federal courts of appeals 
recognized that the Act borrowed its definitions of crimes from New York’s 
laws.53  Furthermore, the Supreme Court noted the link between the 
definitions of robbery and extortion in New York’s laws and in the Act, in 
Evans v. United States54 and Scheidler v. National Organization for 
Women, Inc.55 
B.  The Expansion of Judicial Construction of Hobbs Act Extortion 
Courts have gradually expanded their interpretations of the Hobbs 
Act’s anti-extortion provision over time.56  For the first few years following 
the implementation of the Act, conduct amounting to force, violence, or fear 
was required for an extortion conviction.57  Federal courts of appeals 
eliminated this requirement in the 1970s.58  In the early 1990s, inducement 
was eliminated as an element of Hobbs Act extortion as well.59  The Court 
has only provided a few limiting interpretations on the Hobbs Act during 
the same timeframe.60 
1.  Prosecution of Hobbs Act Extortion in the Absence of Force, 
Violence, or Fear 
For thirty years following the Hobbs Act’s passage, the definition of 
extortion in Section 1951(b)(2)—“actual or threatened force, violence, or 
fear, or under color of official right”61—was interpreted conjunctively: 
public officials were not prosecuted when threats of force, violence, or fear 
were absent.62  In the 1960s, however, federal prosecutors began attempting 
to use the Act to convict state officials for soliciting bribes.63  Courts were 
initially reluctant to broaden the scope of Hobbs Act extortion to encompass 
state officials who did not use threats of violence, force, or fear to solicit 
illicit payments; the courts thought to do so would essentially render the 
crimes of extortion and bribery indistinguishable.64 
                                                          
 53.  See, e.g., United States v. Aguon, 851 F.3d 1158, 1164 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (same).   
 54.  504 U.S. 255, 264–65 (1992).   
 55.  537 U.S. 393, 403 (2003).   
 56.  See infra Part II.B.1–2. 
 57.  See infra Part II.B.1. 
 58.  See infra Part II.B.1. 
 59.  See infra Part II.B.1.  
 60.  See infra Part II.B.2. 
 61.  18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (2012). 
 62.  McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 266 n.5 (1991).  
 63.  See id. at 277–78 (Scalia, J., concurring) (indicating that courts were not pleased when 
federal prosecutors began using the Hobbs Act to punish solicitation of bribes by state officials in 
the 1960s).  
 64.  Id. 
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A significant shift in courts’ understanding of the Act occurred in 1972 
when, in United States v. Kenny,65 the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit determined that Section 1951(b)(2) should be read 
disjunctively:66 Extortion consists of the “actual or threatened force, 
violence, or fear, or under color of official right.”67  The Third Circuit came 
to this conclusion because it believed that the Act merely “repeats the 
common law definition of extortion, a crime which could only be 
committed by a public official, and which did not require proof of threat, 
fear, or duress.”68 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit followed 
in the Third Circuit’s footsteps, also favoring a disjunctive reading of 
Section 1951(b)(2) in United States v. Braasch.69  The Seventh Circuit 
reasoned that “the Act is to be construed broadly.”70  Subsequently, several 
federal courts of appeals adopted this line of reasoning, accepting an 
expansive, disjunctive reading of the Hobbs Act’s definition of extortion.71 
The Supreme Court has also broadened the scope of Hobbs Act 
extortion further by eliminating the inducement requirement.  Until 1992, 
federal courts of appeals were split as to whether inducement was an 
element of Hobbs Act extortion.  The majority view—the position of eight 
circuits—was that inducement was not an element of Hobbs Act extortion 
under the color of official right because no such element existed under the 
common-law definition of extortion.72  Under this view, the crimes of 
extortion and bribery overlap.73  Alternatively, the minority view—that 
inducement is an element of Hobbs Act extortion—was applied by the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in United States v. 
                                                          
 65.  462 F.2d 1205 (3d Cir. 1972).  
 66.   Id. at 1229. 
 67.  18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (2012) (emphasis added).  
 68.  Kenny, 462 F.2d at 1229.  
 69.  505 F.2d 139 (1974).  
 70.  Id. at 152 n.8 (citing United States v. Pranno, 385 F.2d 387, 389 (1967)).  
 71.  E.g., United States v. Harding, 563 F.2d 299, 304 (6th Cir. 1977) (adopting a disjunctive 
reading of Section 1951(b)(2)); United States v. Hall, 536 F.2d 313, 321 (10th Cir. 1976) (same); 
United States v. Hathaway, 534 F.2d 386, 393 (1st Cir. 1976) (same).  
 72.  United States v. Evans, 910 F.2d 790, 792, 796 (11th Cir. 1990); United States v. Garner, 
837 F.2d 1404, 1407, 1423 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v. Spitler, 800 F.2d 1267, 1269, 1274–
75 (4th Cir. 1986); United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 580, 594–96 (3d Cir. 1982) (en banc); 
United States v. French, 628 F.2d 1069, 1070, 1074 (8th Cir. 1980); United States v. Williams, 
621 F.2d 123, 123–24 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Butler, 618 F.2d 411, 413, 417–20 (6th 
Cir. 1980); United States v. Hall, 536 F.2d 313, 320–21 (10th Cir. 1976); United States v. 
Hathaway, 534 F.2d 386, 389–90, 393–95 (1st Cir. 1976). 
 73.  See Jannotti, 637 F.2d at 595 (“The Government is merely required to prove that a public 
official obtained money to which he was not entitled and which he obtained only because of his 
official position.” (quoting United States v. Hedman, 630 F.2d 1184, 1195 (7th Cir. 1980))).  
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O’Grady,74 and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in 
United States v. Aguon.75 
In Evans v. United States, the Supreme Court adopted the majority 
view that inducement is not an element of extortion committed under the 
color of official right.76  The Evans Court first supported its conclusion by 
noting its understanding that at common law, extortion, like bribery, did not 
involve inducement.77  The Court added that the Hobbs Act definition of 
extortion is even broader than it was at common law because it 
encompasses “conduct by a private individual as well as conduct by a 
public official.”78  Though the Court found the legislative history of the 
Hobbs Act to be “sparse and unilluminating,”79 it nevertheless concluded, 
in view of the statutory language and legislative history of the Act, that 
inducement cannot be an element of Section 1951(b)(2) extortion.80 
2.  Limitations on Judicial Construction of the Hobbs Act 
Despite the broad language of Section 1951(b)(2) of the Hobbs Act, 
the Supreme Court has applied limitations to the construction of its 
definition of extortion.  One of these limitations is a restrictive reading of 
the Hobbs Act definition of extortion in regards to campaign contributions 
to elected officials.81  In McCormick v. United States,82 the Court held that 
proof of an explicit quid pro quo arrangement is necessary to uphold an 
extortion conviction of a public official receiving campaign contributions 
intended to influence that official.83 
Additionally, in Scheilder v. National Organization for Women, Inc.,84 
the Supreme Court identified another limitation in holding that a defendant 
must obtain or seek to obtain another’s property in order to be liable for 
Hobbs Act extortion.85  The case before the Court in Scheilder concerned 
the prosecution of defendants who “shut down” abortion clinics.86  The 
prosecution’s theory was that the defendants had committed Hobbs Act 
extortion by threatening respondents in an effort to cause them to forfeit 
                                                          
 74.  742 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1984).  
 75.  851 F.3d 1158, 1166 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc). 
 76.  504 U.S. 255, 260 (1992). 
 77.  Id.  
 78.  Id. at 263–64.   
 79.  Id. at 264.   
 80.  Id. at 268.  
 81.  McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 274 (1991). 
 82.  Id. at 257. 
 83.  Id. at 273  
 84.  537 U.S. 393 (2003).  
 85.  Id. at 410.  
 86.  Id. at 398. 
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their rights to medical services.87  The Court reasoned that to construe the 
definition of extortion so broadly as to contemplate the acts of the 
defendants would render it, and the separate crime of coercion, 
indistinguishable—a result inconsistent with the legislative history of the 
Hobbs Act.88  The Court concluded that because the petitioners did not 
attempt to take the respondent’s property, the charges of conspiring to 
commit extortion were fundamentally flawed.89 
C. The Circuit Split Preceding Ocasio v. United States 
A circuit split exists between the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Sixth Circuit and the Fourth Circuit concerning how the word “another” 
in Section 1951(b)(2) should be construed.  In United States v. Brock,90 the 
Sixth Circuit held that the Hobbs Act term “another” does not encompass 
co-conspirators.91  The Fourth Circuit in United States v. Spitler, however, 
held that a defendant can be found guilty of extorting a co-conspirator under 
the meaning of the term “another” in Section 1951(b)(2).92 
In Spitler, the defendant, Vice President of Transportation, Inspection, 
Inc., complied with the Chief of the Metals Unit of the Maryland State 
Highway Administration’s extortionate demands to purchase for him semi-
automatic rifles, untraceable handguns, and jewelry—both before and after 
being awarded a federally funded contract.93  The defendant contended on 
appeal that he merely acquiesced to the Chief of Metal’s demands; 
therefore, he argued that he was not culpable under Section 1951(b)(2).94  
The Fourth Circuit in Spitler disagreed, deciding that the defendant was no 
mere extortion victim of the public official, but rather was properly 
convicted as an actively engaged co-conspirator.95  In so holding, the court 
reasoned that relevant case law did not demand that it “paint with a broad 
brush and declare a bright line,” the threshold at which a bribe-payer’s 
conduct constitutes conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act extortion.96  The court 
simply determined that the defendant bribe-payer could not claim that he 
was a “mere victim” in the case because the true victims of extortion 
conspiracies are the government and taxpayers.97 
                                                          
 87.  Id. at 400–01.  
 88.  Id.  
 89.  Id. at 410 
 90.  501 F.3d 762 (6th Cir. 2007).  
 91.  Id. at 771. 
 92.  United States v. Spitler, 800 F.2d 1267, 1279 (4th Cir. 1986). 
 93.  Id. at 1269.  
 94.  Id. at 1278.  
 95.  Id. at 1278–79.  
 96.  Id. at 1278.  
 97.  Id.  
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In United States v. Brock,98 the Sixth Circuit held that co-conspirators 
cannot be convicted of Hobbs Act extortion. In Brock, the defendant 
arranged with the supervisory clerk for the criminal division of the county 
courthouse to remove scheduled forfeiture dealings in return for cash 
payments.99  The Sixth Circuit held in favor of the defendant, reasoning that 
the Hobbs Act does not punish extortion in the form of private individuals 
offering bribes to public officials.100  The court determined that the Hobbs 
Act term “another” does not contemplate co-conspirators who obtain 
property and consent from themselves in performing extortive acts.101  The 
court reasoned that the rule of lenity—a cannon of textual interpretation that 
calls for the more lenient of competing interpretations of disputed statutory 
language to be applied—should apply because it believed the Act’s text did 
not unambiguously support the government’s purportedly harsher 
interpretation.102  The court also noted that the government’s theory of co-
conspirator extortion was contrary to federalism: “No one doubts that the 
States have criminal laws prohibiting their citizens from bribing public 
officials.  Is there any reason to doubt the States’ willingness to invoke 
these laws when their citizens engage in schemes as brazen as this one?”103 
D. The Supreme Court Will Apply Statutory Interpretation Principles in 
Ocasio v. United States 
As articulated by Justice Thomas in Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., when 
the Court engages in statutory interpretation, it begins its analysis by 
assessing the plain and ordinary meaning of disputed statutory language.104 
Justice Marshall articulated this principle in Gibbons v. Ogden, in relation 
to Constitutional interpretation thusly: “the enlightened patriots who framed 
our constitution, and the people who adopted it, must be understood to have 
employed words in their natural sense, and to have intended what they have 
said.”105  The Court uses dictionaries to discover the plain and ordinary 
                                                          
 98.  501 F.3d 762 (6th Cir. 2007).  
 99.  Id. at 765. 
 100.  Id. at 768.  
 101.  Id.  
 102.  Id.  
 103.  Id. at 769. 
 104.  See 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997) (“The plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is 
determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, 
and the broader context of the statute as a whole.” (citing Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 
505 U.S. 469, 477 (1992); and then citing McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U.S. 136, 139 (1991))); see 
also Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 127 (1998) (“We begin with the statute’s 
language.”); United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 93 (1985) (disposing of the case in a manner 
which observes the rule of thumb that statutory interpretation begins by analyzing the text of the 
statute in dispute).   
 105.  Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 188 (1824). 
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meaning of such terms.106  Relatedly, per the Court’s ruling in Chapman v. 
United States, the rule of lenity does not factor into the Court’s analysis 
until after the text is examined for its plain meaning, and that plain meaning 
is determined to be unclear.107 
A helpful precedent for the Supreme Court’s resolution of this circuit 
split is its history of construing similarly broad language.  In Ali v. Federal 
Bureau of Prisons,108 the Court construed the statutory term “any” very 
broadly.109  In Ali, the Court was given the task of interpreting Section 
2680(c) of the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”).110  Under Section 
2680(c), the FTCA waiver of the sovereign immunity concerning claims 
arising out of torts committed by federal employees does not apply to “any 
claim arising in respect of the assessment or collection of any tax or 
customs duty, or the detention of any goods, merchandise, or other property 
by any officer of customs or excise or any other law enforcement 
officer.”111  The petitioner in Ali argued that a Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) 
officer who allegedly lost his property during his detainment was liable 
under the FTCA because the statutory term “any” only contemplated law 
enforcement officers acting in an excise or customs capacity, not 
exclusively acting as corrections officers.112  The Court disagreed, 
marshalling its decisions in Harrison v. PPG Industries113 and United States 
v. Gonzales114 in holding that the word “any,” within the statutory scheme, 
had an expansive meaning that contemplated the BOP officer as being 
among those persons statutorily shielded from tort liability.115 
If the Court cannot dispose of a case based on its analysis of disputed 
statutory text alone, it will examine the legislative history of the statute to 
clarify its understanding.116  The fact that the Hobbs Act’s language was 
framed to imitate New York laws is very significant, because both the Field 
                                                          
 106.  See, e.g., Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 128 (“Consider first the word’s primary meaning.”).  
The dictionaries cited by the Court should have existed contemporaneous to the time of the 
statute’s enactment, in order to demonstrate the plain meaning of disputed terminology at the time 
it was drafted.  See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 70 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting) (“Words must be read with the gloss of the experience of those who framed them.”). 
 107.  500 U.S. 453, 463 (1991) (“The rule [of lenity] comes into operation at the end of the 
process of construing what Congress has expressed, not at the beginning as an overriding 
consideration of being lenient to wrongdoers.” (quoting Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 
596 (1961))).  
 108.  552 U.S. 214 (2008). 
 109.  Id. at 218. 
 110.  Id.  
 111.  Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c)). 
 112.  Id. at 218–19.  
 113.  446 U.S. 578 (1980).  
 114.  520 U.S. 1 (1997).  
 115.  Ali, 552 U.S. at 219–20, 227–28.  
 116.  See, e.g., Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 133 (1998) (examining legislative 
history underlying the disputed statutory term subsequent to an analysis of the text of the statute).  
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Code and the Penal Code punish extortion of co-conspirators.117  The 
consistent usage canon states that “identical words used in different parts of 
the same act are intended to have the same meaning.”118  The Court 
specifically countenanced the reasonableness of the notion underlying the 
consistent usage canon in Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United 
States:119  “Undoubtedly, there is a natural presumption that identical words 
used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same 
meaning.”120  The Court’s precedent for applying the consistent usage 
canon will be useful for its construction of the term “another” in light of its 
New York antecedents because those antecedents contemplate co-
conspirator extortion.121 
III. THE COURT’S REASONING 
In United States v. Ocasio, the Fourth Circuit held that Ocasio’s 
conspiracy conviction was correct, on the basis that the term “another” in 
the Hobbs Act contemplates both one whom is both being extorted and one 
whom is a co-conspirator.122  The court stated that it would review de novo 
questions of law, including any issues of statutory interpretation.123 
Ocasio argued that the Fourth Circuit should apply the reasoning of the 
Sixth Circuit in United States v. Brock to reverse his conviction, on the 
basis that conspiracy to extort a co-conspirator operating in the same 
criminal scheme is not contemplated by Section 1951(b)(2).124 The 
government’s position, conversely, rested on the notion that nothing in the 
text of the Hobbs Act precludes the term “another” from contemplating 
criminal co-conspirators.  The court dismissed Ocasio’s arguments that the 
“from another” language forecloses his culpability for extorting co-
conspirators (Moreno and Mejia).125  The court noted that nothing in the 
Hobbs Act compels a restrictive interpretation of the disputed language that 
would negate Ocasio’s conviction.126  The court also rejected Ocasio’s 
attempt to reduce the Spitler rule to absurdity; the Court asserted that the 
“active participation” standard does not render every victim’s consent to a 
                                                          
 117.  See infra Part IV.B.  
 118.  Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995) (quoting Dep’t of Revenue of Or. v. 
ACF Indus., 510 U.S. 332, 342 (1994)). 
 119.  286 U.S. 427 (1932). 
 120.  Id. at 433 (citing Courtauld v. Legh, [1869] 4 LR Exch. 126, 130‒31 (Eng.) (articulating 
the consistent usage canon)).  
 121.  See infra Part IV.B.2.   
 122.  750 F.3d 399 (2014). 
 123.  Id. at 408 (citing United States v. Smith, 451 F.3d 209, 216 (4th Cir. 2006)).  
 124.  Id. at 408–09.  
 125.  Id. at 411 (citing United States v. Brock, 501 F.3d 762, 767 (6th Cir. 2007)). 
 126.  Id.  
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Hobbs Act conspiracy scheme, “a separately punishable conspiracy in every 
[Section] 1951(a) case.”127 
In assessing the relevance and reasoning of the Brock and Spitler 
decisions, the Fourth Circuit concluded that Spitler was the controlling 
precedent because Spitler was decided by a Fourth Circuit panel.128  As a 
result, the Fourth Circuit applied the Spitler “active participation” standard, 
concluding that “a person like Moreno or Mejia, who actively participates 
(rather than merely acquiesces) in a conspiratorial extortion scheme, can be 
named and prosecuted as a co-conspirator even though he is also a 
purported victim of the conspiratorial agreement.”129  The court treated the 
text as being perfectly clear on the scope of liability: nothing in the text 
raised any possibility in the court’s mind that the term “another” could be 
limited to exclude co-conspirators.130   
The Fourth Circuit observed the Supreme Court’s ruling in Robinson 
in determining that the meaning of the text was clear enough to dispose in 
the government’s favor and uphold Ocasio’s conviction.131  The court also 
followed the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Chapman in declining to afford 
Ocasio relief under the rule of lenity because of the lack of ambiguity in the 
text of the statute.132  The issue, currently on appeal before the Supreme 
Court, is whether under Section 1951(b)(2) extortion can only be 
perpetrated by third parties outside of a conspiracy, or whether it can also 
involve co-conspirators.133 
IV. ANALYSIS 
A conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act extortion as defined in Section 
1951(b)(2) requires that conspirators agree to obtain property from another 
party, but that party need not be a third party (that is, someone outside of 
the conspiracy).134  The ordinary meaning of the language of the statute 
compels this conclusion because the word “another” plainly means 
anyone.135  The legislative history of the Hobbs Act supports this 
conclusion as well.  Both the statements of congressmen supporting the 
passage of the Act, and the language of New York codes upon which the 
Act is based, indicate that the word “another” should be broadly 
                                                          
 127.  Id. (quoting Opening Brief for Appellant at 28, Ocasio, 750 F.3d 399 (No. 1:11-cr-
00122-CCB-13)).  
 128.  Id. at 411–12.  
 129.  Id. at 410.  
 130.  Id. at 411 (citing Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997)). 
 131.  Id. at 411–12 (citing Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 463 (1991)).  
 132.  Id. at 412. 
 133.  Petition, supra note 27, at i. 
 134.  See infra Part IV.A–C. 
 135.  See infra Part IV.A.  
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construed.136  Finally, public policy considerations support a broad 
construction of Section 1951(b)(2) as contemplating co-conspirator 
extortion, for it would neither burden judicial economy nor encroach on 
federalism.137  Instead, it would facilitate prosecution of corrupt public 
officials, especially corrupt police officers.138 
A.  The Text of the Hobbs Act Contemplates Co-conspirator Extortion 
The text of Section 1951(b)(2) does not support Ocasio’s assertion that 
Hobbs Act extortion can only involve third parties outside of a criminal 
conspiracy.  The Court’s first step in interpreting Section 1951(b)(2) will be 
to assess the text of the statute.139  If the disputed language is unambiguous, 
the Court’s inquiry will cease.140  The government, in its response to 
Ocasio’s petition for certiorari, argued that, “[t]he statute does not state that 
the defendant must agree to obtain property from someone outside of the 
conspiracy.”141  In making this argument, the government essentially 
invoked the negative implication canon of statutory construction: expressio 
unius est exclusio alterius—the expression of one thing implies the 
exclusion of others.142  This proposition is not persuasive because Ocasio 
could just as easily have invoked the same canon in arguing that, “[t]he 
statute does not state that the defendant must agree to obtain property from 
someone inside of the conspiracy.”143 
The Court’s statutory inquiry, to reiterate, should observe the plain 
meaning rule by beginning with the text.144  Here, the ordinary meaning of 
the term “another” demonstrates that Section 1951(b)(2) is sufficiently 
broad to contemplate extortion of co-conspirators.  Any resource indicating 
                                                          
 136.  See infra Part IV.B.  
 137.  See infra Part IV.C. 
 138.  See infra Part IV.C. 
 139.  See supra note 104 and accompanying text.   
 140.  Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997).   
 141.  Brief for the United States in Opposition at 7, Ocasio v. United States, No. 14-361 (Dec. 
29, 2014).  
 142.  See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF 
LEGAL TEXTS 107 (2012) (“The doctrine properly applies only when the unius (or technically, 
unum, the thing specified) can reasonably be thought to be an expression of all that shares in the 
grant or prohibition involved.”).   
 143.  See id. at 108 (“Even when an all-inclusive sense seems apparent, one must still identify 
the scope of the inclusiveness (thereby limiting implied exclusion).”).  
 144.  See Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 127–32 (1998) (assessing the meaning of 
the phrase “carries a firearm” in light of its primary dictionary definition, its etymology, its use in 
literature, its colloquial usage in society, and its use in case law); compare WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 
CRIMINAL LAW § 2.2 (4th ed. 2003) (“This plain meaning rule, it has been noted, ‘reaffirms the 
preeminence of the statute over materials extrinsic to it.’” (quoting R. DICKERSON, THE 
INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 229 (1975))), with SCALIA & GARNER, supra 
note 142, at 69 (“The ordinary meaning rule is the most fundamental semantic rule of 
interpretation.”).  
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the primary meaning of a disputed term should be roughly concurrent to the 
time in which the statutory term was drafted in order to fairly communicate 
its plain and ordinary meaning.145  The government asserts in Section 
1951(b)(2) that, “‘[w]hoever’ refers to the defendant official and ‘property 
from another’ refers to property not belonging to that official.”146  
Contemporaneous lexicographical authorities support this conclusion.  For 
example, the word “another” in the 1934 edition of Merriam Webster’s 
Second International Dictionary is defined as “indefinitely any one or 
anything else.”147  The 1933 edition of Black’s Legal Dictionary merely 
defined the word “another” as being equivalent to the word “additional.”148  
Moreover, neither of the these dictionaries defined extortion in such a 
manner as to lead one to believe that Hobbs Act extortion only applies to 
third parties.149 
Supreme Court precedent governing statutory interpretation of the 
word “any,” a similarly broad modifier to “another,” also supports the 
application of the ordinary-meaning rule, vindicating the government’s 
construction of the Hobbs Act.  Especially relevant to the Court’s analysis 
in Ocasio is its precedented technique in Ali of deriving the plain meaning 
of the word “any” from Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, in 
determining that, “the word ‘any’ has an expansive meaning, that is, ‘one or 
                                                          
 145.  See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 70 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) 
(“Words must be read with the gloss of the experience of those who framed them.”).   
 146.  Brief for the United States at 21, Ocasio v. United States, No. 14-361 (July 30, 2015) 
(citing Another, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 48 (10th ed. 1993)).  The 
government should not have used the tenth edition of Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary in 
its brief to define the plain and ordinary meaning of the word “another.”  The dictionary cited by 
the government, published in 1993, was not written in a timeframe contemporaneous to the 
passing of the Hobbs Act, and, therefore, does not demonstrate the plain and ordinary meaning of 
the word “another” in 1946.  The word “another,” as defined by a dictionary contemporaneous to 
the passing of the Hobbs Act, is:  
1. One more, by way of addition; an additional one, similar in likeness or effect; as, eat 
another piece.  2. Not the same; different;—often used with to, from, or now usually, 
than; as try another way than that.  3. Any or some other; any one else; some one else; 
as, “Let another man praise thee.”  
Another, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1933) (emphasis added). 
 147.  Another, WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
(William A. Neilson et al. eds., 2d ed. 1934).  This dictionary defines the pronoun “another” as:  
1. One more; a second or additional one.  
2. Any or some other; any different person: indefinitely any one or thing else; some one 
or thing else; as of the three routes one is dangerous, another crowded;—used also with 
one in a reciprocal sense (asked the boys one of another, that is, of each other).  
Id. (emphasis added). 
 148.  Another, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1933).  
 149.  Compare Extortion, WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE, supra note 147, with Extortion, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 148.  
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some indiscriminately of whatever kind.’”150  For the purposes of this case, 
it seems reasonable for the word “another” to be construed in the same 
fashion that the Court has construed the modifier “any,” when 
contemplating whether the Hobbs Act encompasses co-conspirator 
extortion.151  Like the plain meaning of the word “any” in Ali, the ordinary 
meaning of the word “another” here is expansive, and therefore 
contemplates co-conspirators.152  The Court here has “no reason to demand 
that Congress write less economically and more repetitiously,”153 and, 
therefore, should be “unpersuaded by petitioner’s attempt to create 
ambiguity where the statute’s text and structure suggest none.”154  In view 
of this analysis, Ocasio’s assertion at oral argument that the modifier “any” 
contemplates co-conspirators, but “another” does not, is fundamentally 
false.155  In sum, after considering the plain and ordinary meaning of the 
word “another” in Section 1951(b)(2), the Court’s statutory inquiry should 
cease.156 
Two arguments against the government’s construction of the text of 
Section 1951(b)(2) obfuscate the appropriate textual basis for Ocasio’s 
conviction.  First, Ocasio’s supporters argue that the rule of lenity ought to 
compel the Court to choose the narrower construction of the term 
“another.”157  The rule of lenity is “when there are two rational readings of 
a criminal statute, one harsher than the other, we are to choose the harsher 
                                                          
 150.  Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 219 (2008) (quoting United States v. 
Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997) (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 
97 (1976))). 
 151.  The words are intuitively similar in breadth on their face, and the conceptual equivalence 
of these two words is reinforced by the fact that the Field Code of 1865, upon which the Hobbs 
Act is based, critically used the word “any” in identifying the scope of its extortion statute.  See 
infra Part IV.B.2.   
 152.  Compare supra notes 146–148 (comparing various dictionaries’ definition of the 
meaning of the word “another”), with Ali, 552 U.S. at 219 (invoking precedent utilizing 
dictionaries to construe the ordinary meaning of a disputed statutory term).  
 153.  Ali, 552 U.S. at 221 (“Congress could not have chosen a more all-encompassing phrase 
than ‘any other law enforcement officer’ to express its intent.”). 
 154.  Id. at 227 (indicating that the word “any” has an expansive meaning).  
 155.  See Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, Ocasio v. United States, No. 14-361 (Oct. 6, 2015) 
[hereinafter Transcript] (“Mr. Davis: ‘Justice Alito, I think yes, it is.  And two distinctions from 
the Mann Act cases: The first is that the Mann Act used the phrase “any woman,” not “another 
woman.”  I think that case would have been different if it had used the phrase ‘another woman.’  
Justice Alito: ‘Well, “any woman” is broader than “another woman.”  “Any woman” means any of 
the 3.5 billion-plus women in the world, and that subsumes “another woman,” doesn’t it?’”).  
 156.  See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997).  
 157.  See, e.g., Brief for Former United States Attorneys as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner 
at 8, Ocasio v. United States, No. 14-361 (June 8, 2015) [hereinafter Amici Curiae Brief] 
(referencing Scheidler v. National Organization for Women, Inc., 537 U.S. 393, 408–09 (2003), in 
noting that, “[a]fter all, this Court has expressly extended the ‘rule of lenity’ to the Hobbs Act”).  
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only when Congress has spoken in clear and definite language.”158  Ocasio 
confuses the breadth of the term “another” with ambiguity.159  The fact that 
the term “another” in Section 1951(b)(2) unambiguously applies to 
“persons” in general, and not merely third parties outside of a criminal 
conspiracy, as Ocasio suggests, forecloses any application of the rule of 
lenity in this instance.160 
Second, Ocasio argues that the government’s construction of the term 
“another” in Section 1951(b)(2) as contemplating extortion of a co-
conspirator is impermissible because such construction blurs the distinction 
between bribery and extortion.161  Ocasio’s argument is predicated on the 
false notion that bribery and extortion must be mutually exclusive crimes, 
when in fact, historically speaking, the crimes of bribery and extortion have 
always been understood to overlap.162 
The concept that bribery and extortion crimes are not mutually 
exclusive is manifest in case law.  For example, the court held in United 
States v. Kenny that the crimes of extortion and bribery can overlap, since a 
person choosing to pay to influence a public official can be influenced by 
the office of said official.163  The commonsense notion that bribery and 
extortion overlap is illustrated in the scenario where a criminal pays a police 
officer hush money in order to avoid arrest: said police officer commits 
extortion when electing not to arrest a criminal in return for payment, but 
                                                          
 158.  McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 359–60 (1987) (citing United States v. Bass, 404 
U.S. 336, 347–48 (1971); then citing United States v. Universal C. I. T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 
218, 221–22 (1952)).   
 159.  See Transcript, supra note 155 (recounting Justice Alito’s statement: “Well, ‘any’ woman 
is broader than ‘another woman.’  Any woman means any of the 3.5 billion-plus women in the 
world, and that subsumes ‘another woman,’ doesn’t it?”).  
 160.  See Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 596 (1961) (“The rule [of lenity] comes into 
operation at the end of the process of construing what Congress has expressed, not at the 
beginning as an overriding consideration of being lenient to wrongdoers.”); WEBSTER’S NEW 
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, supra note 147, at 902. 
 161.  See Petition, supra note 27, at 15 (“A related problem is that the government’s theory 
also transforms every act of receiving a bribe into a conspiracy.”); see also Brief for Petitioner at 
25, 43–44, Ocasio v. United States, No. 14-361 (June 1, 2015) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner] 
(stating that the Fourth Circuit’s interpretation transforms every payment of a bribe a conspiracy 
to commit extortion); Amici Curiae Brief, supra note 157, at 9 (same).  
 162.  See James Lindgren, The Elusive Distinction Between Bribery and Extortion: From the 
Common Law to the Hobbs Act, 35 UCLA L. REV. 815, 821 (1988) (“Further, most statutes 
prohibiting official extortion from the First Statute of Westminster (1275), through the 19th-
century Field Code punished the mere receipt of a corrupt payment as extortion.” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
 163.  462 F.2d 1205 (3d Cir. 1972), cert denied, 409 U.S. 914 (1972); see also James P. 
Fleissner, Prosecuting Public Officials Under the Hobbs Act: Inducement as an Element of 
Extortion Under Color of Official Right, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1066, 1072 (1985) (“The [Kenny] 
holding thus implied that the crimes of extortion and bribery could overlap, since even a person 
‘voluntarily’ paying an official could be influenced by the coercive force of the office.”).  
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the criminal commits bribery in paying money to avoid arrest.164  Indeed, in 
Evans, the Supreme Court determined that an assertion that a defendant 
committed bribery is not an appropriate defense to a Hobbs Act extortion 
allegation, a ruling that disposes of Ocasio’s argument.165 
B.  The Legislative History of the Hobbs Act Supports the 
Government’s Construction 
Even if the text of the Hobbs Act is not sufficiently clear for the 
disposition of the case, the legislative history of the Hobbs Act reinforces 
the textual basis for Ocasio’s conviction.  The internal legislative history of 
the Hobbs Act—including the congressional debate over the statute and its 
antecedents—and the coverage of the Hobbs Act in the media, support this 
conclusion.166  Furthermore, the external legislative history of the Hobbs 
Act, that is, the New York laws upon which the statute is based, also 
support the government’s construction of Section 1951(b)(2).167 
1.  Internal Legislative History Supports the Government’s 
Construction of the Hobbs Act168 
The initial purpose of the Hobbs Act was to prevent the interference of 
labor unions with interstate commerce.169  The House Debates on the Hobbs 
Act illustrate the intent of Congress.170  Those debates reveal that the statute 
was designed to criminalize behavior that the Supreme Court had ruled was 
not contemplated under the 1934 Anti-Racketeering Act.171  Indeed, in 
                                                          
 164.  Behavior constituting bribery is punished by federal extortion statutes such as the Travel 
Act and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), despite the fact that 
those statutes afford different penalties for said behavior.  18 U.S.C. §§ 1952, 1962  (2012). 
 165.  See Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 267 n.18 (determining that extortion under 
color of official right and bribery are not mutually exclusive).  
 166.  See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 167.  See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 168.  “Internal legislative history” refers to legislative materials related to the Hobbs Act.  
 169.   See supra Part II.A. 
 170.  See ARMAND J. THIEBLOT, JR. & THOMAS R. HAGGARD, UNION VIOLENCE: THE 
RECORD AND THE RESPONSE BY COURTS, LEGISLATURES, AND THE NLRB 255 n.47 (1983) (“The 
debates in the House on H.R. 653 were fairly extensive and are as much a legitimate source of 
legislative history from which probable legislative intent may be deduced as are the debates on the 
identical bill in the following session.” (citing United States v. Emmons, 410 U.S. 396, 404–05 
n.14 (1973))). 
 171.  See id. at 257 (“Perhaps the clearest indication of what Congress intended by its 
repudiation of Local 807 can be found in the fact that the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Stone 
was repeatedly referred to in approving terms.”).  Though, as introduced in the Senate, the Anti-
Racketeering Act did not mention activities of labor unions, it seems evident that the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of that statute struck against its underlying legislative intent, namely being 
to punish labor union crime.  See id. at 245 (“The original federal anti-extortion statute, known as 
the Anti-Racketeering Act, was one of several bills that came out of the extensive investigations 
of ‘racketeering’ conducted in 1933 by the Copeland Committee, a special subcommittee of the 
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response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Local 807, the Hobbs Act 
legislation went through the upper chambers of Congress like a “jet-
propelled missile.”172  The public was overwhelmingly in favor of the 
legislation.173  Congressional support for the legislation was equally 
overwhelming.174  The Act entered into force despite President Truman 
initially vetoing it.175 
Statements of Representatives Hancock, Celler, Springer, and 
Whittington, all supporters of the Hobbs Act, demonstrate that the Act’s 
most vocal supporters intended it to be broadly construed.176  Though the 
Act’s initial purpose was to fight labor racketeering, the intent of Congress 
was to codify the common law crime of extortion.177  Critically, the Hobbs 
Act was not drafted merely to criminalize the activities of Teamsters that 
interfered with interstate commerce: the word “whoever” in Section 
                                                          
Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce.  As introduced in the Senate, this bill did not 
specifically include or exclude the activities of labor unions.” (footnotes omitted)); Robert C. 
Albright, Part of Case Bill Back at White House: Senate Passes Hobbs “Racke” Measure, Vetoed 
as Rider, Without Debate, WASH. POST, June 22, 1946, at A1. 
 172.  William Knighton, Jr., Senate Passes Hobbs Measure Unanimously, Action Is 
Unexpected, BALT. SUN, June 22, 1946, at A1. 
 173.  See At Long Last, the Hobbs Bill Becomes the Law of the Land, BALT. SUN, July 5, 1946, 
at A14 (“There was no doubt that the general sentiment of the public was in its favor.”).  
 174.  See C. P. Ives, A Clinical Chronology of the Hobbs Bill, BALT. SUN, July 1, 1946, at A10 
(“Now try a little arithmetic.  If all the Hobbs-bill votes on the four occasions when in one form or 
another the bill was before the House are totaled, the result is 1,019 votes in favor to 446 votes in 
opposition.  The Senate voted on the Hobbs bill in one form or another three times, with a total of 
142 votes in favor to 84 against.  Adding the House and Senate tallies, we get 1,161 votes in favor 
of the Hobbs bill in one form or another to 530 votes against.”).  
 175.  THIEBLOT & HAGGARD, supra note 170, at n.48.  As Thieblot and Haggard noted:  
After passing the House in independent form, 91 CONG. REC. 11,922 (1945), the 
substance of the Hobbs Act was also incorporated into the Case Bill, H.R. 4908, 79th 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1945), which passed Congress but which was vetoed by President 
Truman, 92 CONG. REC. 674 (1946).  Immediately after the veto, the Senate took up 
and passed the Hobbs Act as previously approved in independent form by the House, 
92 CONG. REC. 7308 (1946), thus making tit law in spite of the veto. 
Id. (citing John A. Carver, Jr., Comment, Labor Law—A New Federal Antiracketeering Law, 35 
GEO. L.J. 362 (1947); then citing Logan D. Howell, Comment, The Hobbs Act—An Amendment to 
the Federal Anti-Racketeering Act, 25 N.C. L. REV. 58 (1946)).  
 176.  See infra notes 178–181.  
 177.  As one United States Attorney explains: 
No debate centered on official corruption, since the concern of the Congress at the time 
of passage was labor racketeering.  Nevertheless, Congress adopted language contained 
in the New York Code in defining extortion.  Included within that definition was the 
obtaining of property “under color of official right.”  The Hobbs Act as enacted thus 
codified the English common law crime of extortion, an offense that could be 
committed only by public officials, and that consisted of the taking of property by such 
an official which was not due him or his office.  Unlike the other activity prohibited by 
the Hobbs Act, which generally fell within the common law prohibitions against 
blackmail or assault, extortion by public officials was a misdemeanor at common law.  
Lee J. Radek, Hobbs Act, in PROSECUTION OF PUBLIC CORRUPTION CASES, supra note 17, app. F 
at 413, 415. 
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1951(b)(2), according to Representative Hancock, was intended to “remove 
all question that Antiracketeering Act penalties are meant to apply to all 
persons, including union officers or members, if they practice robbery or 
extortion.”178  Representative Celler indicated that the Hobbs Act was 
intended to apply to any citizen committing acts of extortion or robbery.179  
Indeed, Representative Springer’s rejoinder to the vociferous criticism of 
the Act by pro-labor congressmen was that the proposed legislation was so 
sweeping that it did not target labor in particular.180  In sum, Ocasio’s claim 
that the Hobbs Act does not punish extortion of a co-conspirator cannot be 
sustained—the statute was intended to punish extortion and robbery, in 
Representative Whittington’s words, “no matter by whom committed.”181 
2.  External Legislative History Supports the Government’s 
Construction182 
The Hobbs Act was drafted to imitate the New York Penal Code of 
1909 (“Penal Code”), and the Penal Code’s predecessor, the Field Code of 
1865.183  Ocasio admits that the Hobbs Act was framed to imitate these 
New York laws,184 but is wrong to nevertheless assert that there is no 
evidence suggesting that Congress intended the Hobbs Act to grant federal 
prosecutors’ the authority approved by the Fourth Circuit decision in 
Spitler.185  An analysis of both New York codes supports the government’s 
construction of Section 1951(b)(2) as embracing extortion of a co-
conspirator.186 
Analysis of the Penal Code supports the notion that a conspirator can 
extort their co-conspirator under the Hobbs Act.  Section 850 of Penal Code 
Article 80 (titled “Extortion and Threats”) defines extortion generally as 
                                                          
 178.  91 CONG. REC. 11,900 (1945) (statement of Rep. Hancock) (emphasis added).  It is not 
inappropriate in this instance to use news coverage to illustrate the purpose of the Hobbs Act.  
Representative Hancock himself cited news coverage of the Hobbs Act legislation in articulating 
the purpose of Congress, through the Hobbs Act, to supplant the decision of the Supreme Court in 
Local 807.  Id.  
 179.  See id. at 11,909 (statement of Rep. Celler) (“This act is intended to apply only to a 
citizen who is guilty of robbery or extortion.”).  
 180.  See id. at 11,911 (statement of Rep. Springer) (“I state that there is nothing in this 
legislation which relates to labor.  Labor is not mentioned in the bill.  It applies to every American 
citizen.”).  
 181.  See id. at 11,913 (statement of Rep. Whittington) (“It punishes extortion and robbery no 
matter by whom committed.”).   
 182.  “External” refers to the New York laws the Hobbs Act was framed to imitate. 
 183.  See supra notes 49–52 and accompanying text (providing the New York Penal Code and 
Field Code that guided the framing of the Hobbs Act).  
 184.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 161, at 40–41 (quoting Sekhar v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 
2721, 2724 (2013)).  
 185.  Id. at 40–41, 42. 
 186.  Compare N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 850–59, 2120–28 (Consol. 1909) (defining offenses), with 
4 COMM’RS OF THE CODE, supra note 52, at §§ 613–19 (same). 
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“the obtaining property from another, with his consent, induced by a 
wrongful use of force or fear, or under color of official right.”187  The 
definition of “extortion committed under color of official right” in Section 
854,188 and the definition of “a person acting under threats” in Section 
859189—both stated under Article 80—also use the critical term “another.” 
Per the Court’s paradigm for statutory interpretation set out in 
Robinson, it can look to the usage of the term “another” in the greater 
statutory context of Article 80 to understand its meaning.190  In applying 
this canon, Section 859 of the Penal Code is instructive towards unpacking 
the meaning of the word “another” as it applies to extortion.  Critically, 
Section 859 employs the word “another” to refer to a person within a 
criminal conspiracy.191  The clause, “by threats of another person engaged 
in that act or omission,” specifically links the word “another” to the 
conspiracy of “two or more persons” involved in the commission of a 
crime.192  Therefore, the presumption of consistent usage of the term 
“another” in Article 80 of the Penal Code compels the conclusion that the 
term “another” contemplates extortion as being a crime that can be 
committed by any person—including a co-conspirator—engaged in an act 
or omission constituting extortion.193  Absent any evidence to the contrary, 
it logically follows that the drafters of the Hobbs Act adopted this 
construction of the word “another” in modeling the language of Hobbs Act 
on the Penal Code of 1909.194 
                                                          
 187.  N.Y. PENAL LAW § 850. 
 188.  Id. § 854.  Section 854 of the Penal Code provides: 
A public officer, or a person pretending to be such, who, unlawfully and maliciously, 
under pretense or color of official authority:  
1. Arrests another, or detains him against his will; or,  
2. Seizes or levies upon another’s property; or,  
3. Dispossesses another of any lands or tenements; or,  
4. Does any other act, whereby another person is injured in his person, property, or 
rights,  
5. Commits oppression and is guilty of a misdemeanor.  
Id. 
 189.  Id. § 859.  Section 859 of the Penal Code provides: 
Where a crime is committed or participated in by two or more persons, and is 
committed, aided, or participated in by any one of them, only because, during the time 
of its commission, he is compelled to do, or to aid or participate in the act, by threats of 
another person engaged in that act or omission, and reasonable apprehension on his part 
of instant death or grievous bodily harm, in case he refuses, the threats and 
apprehension constitute duress, and excuse him.  
Id.   
 190.  See supra note 104.   
 191.  N. Y. PENAL LAW § 859.   
 192.  Id.  
 193.  See id. (using the term “another” in a manner inclusive of behavior, either action or 
omission, that equates to extortion).   
 194.  See id. (defining the term “another” as inclusive of intra-conspiratorial extortion).  
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A similar analysis of the model Field Code of 1865 leads to the same 
result.195  The word “another,” as used in the Field Code, was meant to 
apply broadly to “every person” who engaged in extortionate behavior, not 
merely extortionate behavior directed towards third parties.196  The broad 
scope of the Field Code bolsters the consistent usage canon analysis of the 
Penal Code, which supports the government’s construction of Section 
1951(b)(2) in this case.197 
C.  Public Policy Benefits from the Government’s Construction of the 
Hobbs Act 
The Hobbs Act may be the most important instrument for prosecuting 
extortion in federal law.198  Other laws punishing extortion do not possess 
the slight burden of proof the Hobbs Act requires relative to the strength of 
the punishment it imposes.199  For example, the Travel Act punishes 
distribution of illicitly obtained proceeds of illegal activities affecting 
                                                          
 195.  Compare id. (“Extortion is the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, 
induced by a wrongful use of force or fear, or under color of official right.”), with 4 COMM’RS OF 
THE CODE, supra note 52, § 613 (“Extortion is the obtaining of property from another, with his 
consent, induced by a wrongful use of force or fear, or under color of official right.”).  The 
commission that developed the Field Code was appointed in 1847.  John L. McClellan, 
Codification, Reform, and Revision: The Challenge of a Modern Federal Criminal Code, 4 DUKE 
L.J. 663, 671 (1971).  In 1850, the commission submitted complete codes of criminal and civil 
procedure to the New York legislature, though only the latter was adopted.  Id.  In 1857 the New 
York legislature requested that another commission to develop penal, civil, criminal codes, and 
codes of criminal and civil procedure.  Id. The new commission was headed by several experts at 
bar, including chairman David Dudley Field, Alexander W. Bradford, and William Curtis Noyes.  
GERHARD O. W. MUELLER, CRIME, LAW, AND THE SCHOLARS: A HISTORY OF SCHOLARSHIP IN 
AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW 34 (1969).  Upon the commission’s submission of its work to the 
legislature in 1865, only the code of criminal procedure was adopted by New York.  Id.  
 196.  See 4 COMM’RS OF THE CODE, supra note 52, at §§ 615–19 (stating, in the following 
provisions: Section 615: “Every person who extorts any money or other property from another, 
under circumstances not amounting to robbery, by means of force or any threat such as is 
mentioned in the last section, is punishable by imprisonment in a state prison not exceeding five 
years.”  Section 617: “Every person, who, by any extortionate means, obtains from another his 
signature to any paper or instrument, whereby, if such signature were freely given, any property 
would be transferred, or any debt, demand, charge or right of action created, is punishable in the 
same manner as if the actual delivery of such property or payment of the amount of such debt, 
demand, charge or right of action, were obtained.” Section 618: “Every person who, with intent to 
extort any money or other property from another, sends to any person any letter or another 
writing, whether subscribed or not, expressing or implying, or adapted to imply, any threat, such 
as specified in section 614, is punishable in the same manner as if such money or property were 
actually obtained by means of such threat.”  Section 619: “Every person who unsuccessfully 
attempts by means of any verbal threat, such as is specified in Section 614, to extort money or 
other property from another, is guilty of a misdemeanor.” (emphasis added)).  
 197.  Compare N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 850–59, 2120–28, and 4 COMM’RS OF THE CODE, supra 
note 52, §§ 613–19 (broadly criminalizing extortionate behavior of “every person”) with 18 
U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (2012) (criminalizing extortion of “another”). 
 198.  See S. REP. NO. 96-553, at 643 (1980) (“Perhaps the single most important extortion 
provision in current Federal law is the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951.”). 
 199.  18 U.S.C. §§ 665(a), 872, 874, 875(a), 875(b), 876(b), 877, 878(b), 1952 (2012).  
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interstate commerce with merely a fine and/or five years or less of jail 
time.200  Public policy, therefore, supports a construction of the Act that 
encompasses co-conspirator extortion because it is an effective anti-
corruption measure, especially in regards to police corruption.201 
1.  An Expansive Interpretation of the Hobbs Acts Combats 
Corruption 
An expansive interpretation of the Hobbs Act as contemplating co-
conspirator extortion within the “under color of public right” clause of 
Section 1951(b)(2) benefits public policy by helping to combat corruption.  
The historic tendency of the judiciary to broadly construe the Hobbs Act, 
emanating from the Supreme Court’s decision in Kenny is justified, given 
that public corruption is a national problem.202  The remarks of the 
Honorable Arnold I. Burns, Deputy Attorney General of the United States 
at the New York Winter Conference in 1988 serve to illustrate that 
reality.203  Burns noted that while levels of public corruption are difficult to 
quantify due to the discrete and illicit nature of criminal activity, seventy-
five percent of FBI field offices at one point during his tenure reported that 
they were challenged by an epidemic of public corruption.204  The 
Department of Justice, as Burns stated, responded to this problem by 
making prosecution for political corruption a top departmental priority.205  
Consequently, the DOJ’s efforts have met great success—between 1977 
and 1986 alone, federal corruption convictions increased fourfold, in large 
part thanks to the enforcement of the Hobbs Act.206 
Though the federal government has a variety of statutory weapons to 
fight corruption,207 the Hobbs Act is an especially favorable tool given the 
slight burden of proof it requires (de minimis interference with interstate 
                                                          
 200.  18 U.S.C. § 1952. 
 201.  See infra note 220 (indicating that criminal convictions of corrupt public officials can be 
an impetus to reform).  
 202.  See supra note 1. 
 203.  See generally Arnold I. Burns, Hon. Deputy Att’y General of the United States, Address 
at the 1988 Winter Conference of New York State District Attorneys Association at the Omni 
Park Central Hotel (Jan. 21, 1988), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/109132NCJRS.pdf (remarking that public corruption 
is a national problem meriting a federal response).  
 204.  Id. at 2 (“However, we do know that in a Department of Justice survey just a few years 
ago, 75 percent of the FBI’s field offices reported state and local public corruption as one of their 
most serious problems.  And we also know that prosecutions at both the federal level and the state 
and local level are definitely up as our law enforcement agencies are working harder and more 
effectively to curb this plague of public corruption.”).  
 205.  Id.  
 206.  Id. at 4.  
 207.  Examples include the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2012), and the Racketeer Influenced 
and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (2012).  
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commerce)208 and the severity of the penalty (a twenty-year maximum 
sentence)209 contained within it.210  Litigation concerning this “under color 
of official right” clause has expanded in large measure because of its 
superiority as a tool for attacking state and local corruption.211  Successful 
corruption prosecutions under the “color of official right” clause of Section 
1951(b)(2) have not varied substantially by jurisdiction.212  A construction 
of Section 1951(b)(2) as encompassing co-conspirator extortion advances 
the ability of the DOJ to effectively apply its most potent statutory weapon 
for fighting corruption.213 
The Hobbs Act, as illustrated in the prosecution of Samuel Ocasio, is 
an especially helpful tool for prosecuting police corruption.  Investigation 
and prosecution of police corruption by state authorities is problematic 
because it involves a classic conundrum: Quis custodiet ipsos custodies—
“who watches the watchmen?”214  The difficulties associated with state 
investigation and prosecution of police corruption were summed up by 
Herbert Beigel as follows: “(1) One cannot effectively investigate himself; 
(2) Local government officials are themselves paying the police for favors; 
and (3) The citizenry largely acquiesces in and enjoys the favors and 
leniency granted by the police who can be bought.”215  Corruption has 
                                                          
 208.  See United States v. Baylor, 517 F.3d 899, 901–03 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing cases). 
 209.  18 U.S.C. 1951(a) (2012).  
 210.  See Radek, supra note 177, app. F at 413, 414 (“Despite the fact that the Travel Act (18 
U.S.C. § 1952), RICO (18 U.S.C. § 1962), and 18 U.S.C. § 666 provide for more direct Federal 
jurisdiction over bribery of state and local officials, the most popular statutory tool used by 
Federal law enforcement for combating state and local corruption continues to be the prohibition 
against extortion contained in the Hobbs Act.  The reasons for this popularity are basic: ease of 
proof and severity of penalty.  These advantages, however, also could foster judicial animosity.  
For this reason it is important for Department personnel to exercise extreme care in the use of this 
powerful tool so that its continuing availability is insured.”).  
 211.  See White-Collar Crime: A Survey of Law—Extortion, 18 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 249, 257, 
262 (1980) (“Litigation concerning this segment of the definition of extortion is the most rapidly 
growing area under the Hobbs Act, because it is an expedient vehicle for federal prosecution of 
local political corruption. . . .  Nonetheless, a recent GAO Report, analyzing convictions of 
federal, state, and local officials in eight judicial districts in 1977–78, indicates that the Hobbs Act 
is a far more effective tool in attacking state and local corruption than is the Travel Act.”).  
 212.  See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, CRIMINAL 
RESOURCE MANUAL § 2404 (1997), http://www.justice.gov/usam/criminal-resource-manual-
2404-hobbs-act-under-color-official-right (“This theory of extortion under color of official right 
has resulted in the successful prosecution of a wide range of officials, including those serving on 
the federal, state and local levels.”).   
 213.  See id. (explaining the efficacy of Hobbs Act prosecutions).  
 214.  Herbert Beigel, Criminal Law: The Investigation and Prosecution of Police Corruption, 
65 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 135 n.2 (1974) explaining the difficulties of attacking police 
corruption); David Isenberg, Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodies? HUFFPOST BUS. BLOG (May 31, 
2010, 12:25 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-isenberg/quis-custodiet-ipsos-
cust_b_595304.html.  
 215.  Beigel, supra note 214. 
 130 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW ENDNOTES [VOL. 75:105 
afflicted municipal law enforcement from its very inception.216  A variety of 
reports—such as that of the Knapp and Mollen Commissions in New York, 
appointed in April of 1970 and July of 1992 respectively—as well as the 
Chicago Commission appointed in February of 1997, have indicated that 
municipal police corruption is an important national issue.217  The Knapp 
Commission identified two classes of police corruption: (1) grass-eaters—
corrupt police who passively accept gratuities but do not pursue corrupt 
payments, and (2) meat-eaters—corrupt police who aggressively pursue 
scenarios they can exploit for financial gain.218  Importantly, the Mollen 
Commission found that in New York City, police corruption has gradually 
worsened over time, with meat-eating displacing grass-eating as the 
dominant form of police corruption.219 
Herbert Beigel argues that true police reform can only be 
accomplished internally.220  The crux of this argument is the Weberian 
notion that “culture is destiny,”221 and, therefore, that the ultimate check 
against corruption is the zeitgeist of an organization.222  While this point has 
merit, the government must necessarily do what it can to cast corruption 
into the public eye, which may serve as an impetus for political action.223  
As Assistant Attorney General William F. Weld stated: 
 Witnesses who do not see bribery or extortion as serious crimes 
do not want to come forward, do not see the need to testify, and 
                                                          
 216.  U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-98-111, LAW ENFORCEMENT: 
INFORMATION ON DRUG-RELATED POLICE CORRUPTION 6 (1998).  The first municipal police 
department in the United States, the New York Police Department, was plagued by corruption in 
1844, the year of its inception.  Id.  
 217.  Id. at 1–6.  
 218.  Id. at 6. 
 219.  Id. at 8. 
 220.  Beigel, supra note 214, at 135–36.  Beigel concludes:  
No matter how many individual officers are actually indicted and convicted in any 
investigation, there will be no appreciable effect on the day-to-day operations and 
internal disciplinary mechanism of the police department unless efforts are made by 
those directly in charge of the department to institute major reforms.  Consequently, it 
is difficult to justify a federal investigation of police corruption on the basis that such 
an investigation will have any long run effect on the quality or integrity of local law 
enforcement over which the federal government exercises little control.  
Id. at 155.  
 221.  See generally MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE “SPIRIT” OF CAPITALISM 
(1905), reprinted in THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE “SPIRIT” OF CAPITALISM AND OTHER 
WRITINGS (Peter Baehr & Gordon C. Wells eds. & trans., Penguin Books 2002) (generally 
advancing the theory that cultural forces drive history and precipitate economic and political 
change); see also ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1835), reprinted in 
DEMOCRACY AND AMERICA AND TWO ESSAYS ON AMERICA 23, 58 (Gerald E. Bevan trans., 
Penguin Books 2003) (same).  
 222.  See Burns, supra note 203, at 9 (arguing that the real check against public corruption is 
public outcry).  
 223.  See Beigel, supra note 214, at 156 (explaining that conviction of corrupt public officials 
can spur reform).  
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will not cooperate in investigations.  Prosecutors who are 
reluctant to challenge the power structure, and judges who let 
corrupt officials stay on the street, have unwittingly aided and 
abetted this problem. 
 . . . . 
. . . The most effective thing the Justice Department can do is to 
bring more corruption cases, cases designed to attack the corrupt 
power structure wherever it exists and cases which challenge the 
assumption of any of those on top who may believe they are 
above the law.  It is important that we bring cases that are 
designed to change public attitudes, cases that make it apparent 
who has profited at the public’s expense.224 
Federal investigation and prosecution under the Hobbs Act are 
essential, as they can deliver the political pressure necessary to precipitate 
internal reforms.225  The Hobbs Act is an important tool for punishing 
police corruption in the form of a separate offense or as a predicate offense 
under a RICO prosecution,226 especially in cases of co-conspirator extortion 
involving grass-eating police officers like Samuel Ocasio.227 
While some may argue that an expansive interpretation of Section 
1951(b)(2) would lead to an abuse of prosecutorial discretion, this concern 
is not well founded.  Sufficient internal institutional checks are already in 
place on prosecutorial power in relation to the use of Section 1951(b)(2).228  
The DOJ recognizes that overzealous application of the Hobbs Act may 
inspire judicial animosity; therefore, DOJ personnel are encouraged, “to 
exercise extreme care in the use of this powerful tool so that its continuing 
availability is insured.”229  To this end, approval of the DOJ Criminal 
Division is required for arrests and indictments in Hobbs Act cases that do 
not involve violence or force.230  Therefore, construction of Section 
1951(b)(2) as contemplating co-conspirator extortion does not present the 
danger of future abuse of prosecutorial discretion. 
One may reasonably question whether an expanded reading of the 
Hobbs Act extortion provision creates redundancy in the law given that 
                                                          
 224.  William F. Weld, Introduction, in PROSECUTION OF PUBLIC CORRUPTION CASES, supra 
note 17, at i, iv. 
 225.  See Beigel, supra note 214, at 156 (“A police department thoroughly investigated and 
scandalized by indictments and convictions of its officers for extensive wrongdoing may be forced 
to revise and update its operations and its relationship with the public.”).  
 226.  Edward S. G. Dennis, Jr. & Dennis O. Wilson, Investigation and Prosecution of Police 
Corruption Cases, in PROSECUTION OF PUBLIC CORRUPTION CASES, supra note 17, at 65, 72. 
 227.  See id. (“The Hobbs Act serves as a particularly useful tool in reaching police corruption.  
It may serve as a predicate offense under a RICO prosecution or it may be charged as a separate 
offense.”).  
 228.  See infra note 225.  
 229.  Radek, supra note 177, app. F at 413, 415. 
 230.  Id. at 421. 
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there are other statutes that punish crimes contemplated under the Act.  
Where compound offenses are committed, however, ancillary sentence 
grading (also known as “piggyback grading”) is usually applied.231  In 
addition, deterrence and retribution values inhere in the sentence length for 
a crime because punishment extends in proportion to the magnitude of the 
offense.232 
2. Congressional Reform Efforts Evidence the Benefits of an 
Expansive Interpretation of the Hobbs Act 
Congressional efforts to reform federal criminal law also demonstrate 
that an expansive interpretation of the Hobbs Act as contemplating co-
conspirator extortion is justified.  In 1966, the National Commission on 
Reform of Federal Laws, also known as the Brown Commission, set to 
work on creating a draft criminal code.233  In 1971, the draft federal code 
eviscerated the Hobbs Act by treating the crime of extortion under the 
Hobbs Act as theft.234  However, after two years of processing the draft 
federal code, the Senate’s final product, S. 1,235 introduced on January 4, 
1973, re-embraced the original language of the Hobbs Act.236  On March 
27, 1973, the DOJ Criminal Code Revision Unit introduced a proposed 
alteration of its own in S. 1400237 that critically removed the “under color of 
                                                          
 231.  Note, Piggyback Jurisdiction in the Proposed Federal Criminal Code, 81 YALE L.J. 1209 
(1972).  
As the Commission notes, there is substantial precedent for piggyback jurisdiction.  The 
Federal Bank Robbery Act, enacted in 1934, provides for an additional sentence when 
the offender assaults, kidnaps, or kills someone ‘in committing’ a bank robbery. . . .  
Even stronger precedent for the piggyback provision, though not mentioned by the 
Commission, is § 7 of the Enforcement Act of 1870.  
Id. at 1214 (footnotes omitted). 
 232.  McClellan, supra note 195, at 696–97.  McClellan notes:  
“Piggyback” grading means that crimes against persons and property occurring in the 
course of another federal offense become federally prosecutable as related offenses.  
This technique may be illustrated by again noting that under present law, as well as the 
proposed Code, intimidation of a federal judge is punishable by five [years’] 
imprisonment.  If the intimidation takes the form of murder, prosecution may be had 
under the proposed Code for the ‘murder’ as well as the ‘intimidation.’  
Id.  
 233.  THIEBLOT & HAGGARD, supra note 170, at 285. 
 234.  Id. 
 235.  S. 1, 93d Cong. (1973).  
 236.  See THIEBLOT & HAGGARD, supra note 170, at 286.  Section 2-9C3 of S. 1 provided: “A 
person is guilty of extortion if he intentionally obtains services or property of another from 
another person, with the consent of the other person, where such consent is induced by wrongful 
use of actual or threatened force, violence or fear, or under color of official right.”  S. 1, 93d 
Cong. § 2-9C3 (1973). 
 237.  S. 1400, 93d Cong. (1973).  
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official right” clause of the Hobbs Act.238  On May 2, 1977, the Senate 
introduced S. 1437, which represented a distillation of the three earlier 
proposals that importantly included the “under color of official right” 
provision.239  While S. 1437 failed as its antecedents had, Senator Ted 
Kennedy attempted to push the Criminal Code Reform Act through by 
introducing S. 1722240 in 1979—a bill identical to S. 1437, and S. 1630241 in 
1981—which merely inserted the word “wrongful” into the Hobbs Act.242  
Significantly, in reviewing this history, no proposed congressional revision 
of federal criminal law ever made any indication that co-conspirator 
extortion was not contemplated in the original language of the Hobbs Act. 
3. An Expansive Construction of the Hobbs Act Does Not Encroach 
on Federalism  
Interpreting Section 1951(b)(2) to encompass co-conspirator extortion 
does not, as some may fear, encroach on federalism.243  Federal criminal 
jurisdiction is utilized for three purposes: (1) to punish criminal matters of 
exclusive federal concern, (2) to punish criminal matters that state or local 
authorities are incapable of addressing, and (3) to punish noncompliance 
with federal administrative regulations.244  These purposes map onto the 
“inherent tension between the need to combat official impropriety using the 
most effective tools available and the importance of maintaining tradition 
state functions.”245  It is important to remember that the teleological 
underpinnings of the Hobbs Act lie in a fundamental mistrust of state 
governments’ ability to punish criminal activity contemplated in Section 
1951(b)(2) on their own.246  The address of Representative Joseph R. 
Eastman to the subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee on May 1, 
1942, in the wake of the Supreme Court’s widely bemoaned decision in 
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Local 807, serves to illustrate this point.247  As Eastman stated: “There 
would have been no need for this statute if the local authorities could have 
been depended upon to enforce the law . . . the shameful fact seems to be 
the local authorities could not be depended upon . . . .”248  While 
prosecution of state and local corruption is chiefly the prerogative of state 
and local authorities, federal prosecution of state and local corruption is 
needed where state and local authorities are incapable of addressing stark or 
systemic instances of corruption due their lack of expertise, resources, or 
because they are corrupt.249 
4. An Expansive Construction of the Hobbs Act Does Not 
Constitute Overcriminalization 
The Brown Commission’s raison d’être stemmed from the concern 
that the federal criminal code contained superfluous or unnecessary 
statutes.250  As President Johnson stated in a speech on March 9, 1966: “A 
number of our criminal laws are obsolete.  Many are inconsistent in their 
efforts to make the penalty fit the crime.  Many—which treat essentially the 
same crimes—are scattered in a crazy-quilt patchwork throughout our 
criminal code.”251  Today many continue to complain of over-
criminalization, as is illustrated by the suggestion of the Honorable Alex 
Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit, that Congress “[r]epeal three felonies a day 
for three years.”252 
In response to this concern, it first must be noted that Section 
1951(b)(2) does not render prototypical anti-extortion or anti-bribery 
statutes superfluous.  The notion that the Hobbs Act is an indispensable 
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anti-corruption tool is expressed in a letter submitted by DOJ Assistant 
Attorney General Richard Thornburgh to the Chairman of the 
Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures, John C. McClellan, on 
February 19, 1976: 
[C]ontrary to the assumption in the draft Report, the conduct 
reached by the “under color of official right” offense would not 
be preserved by the possibility of a prosecution for classic 
bribery.  To establish bribery under section 1351 of S. 1 the 
prosecution must show that the defendant public servant accepted 
“anything of value in return for an agreement or understanding 
that the recipient’s official action as a public servant will be 
influenced thereby, or that the recipient will violate a real duty as 
public servant.”  Proving the existence of such a quid pro quo, 
which is the essence of bribery, presents far more difficult 
problems of proof than to make out the “under color of official 
right” offense.253 
Congress’s continued support for the “under color of official right” clause 
of Section 1951(b)(2) throughout its debate for federal criminal law reform 
demonstrates that the provision is neither superfluous nor a manifestation of 
over-criminalization, but rather is necessary to fight corruption.254 
5. A Broad Construction of Section 1951(b)(2) Will Not Impair Judicial 
Economy 
It is evident that construing Section 1951(b)(2) to encompass co-
conspirator extortion will not impair judicial economy by significantly 
burdening the caseload of U.S. district courts.  The United States 
Sentencing Commission report for the Fiscal Year 2004 indicates that only 
a bare 1% of guideline defendants in the Fourth Circuit were punished for 
racketeering or extortion related offenses, as compared to 0.9% 
nationally.255  The Sentencing Commission’s Report for Fiscal Year 2014 
indicates that the share of guideline defendants who have committed 
racketeering or extortion related offenses are similarly low: 2.3% for the 
Fourth Circuit as compared to 1.1% nationally.256  Judicial caseload 
indicators for fiscal year 2014 illustrate an overall decrease of total criminal 
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cases filed in U.S. district courts from 92,226 in 2005, to 81,226, in 2014 (a 
decrease of 11.9%).257  The number of criminal cases filed in U.S. district 
courts for extortion crimes reflects this overall trend, decreasing from 243 
in 1995, to 159 in 2013.258  Additionally, the number of state and local 
officials charged by the DOJ’s Public Integrity Section over the past two 
decades was consistently low: the total number of those charged in 1995, as 
well as in 2014, was approximately 300.259  In view of these metrics, there 
is no statistical basis for a claim that interpreting the Hobbs Act’s extortion 
provision as contemplating co-conspirator extortion would increase the 
marginal number of federal extortion charges per year sufficient to burden 
the economy of the federal judiciary. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Ocasio v. United States presents the Supreme Court with an 
opportunity to reiterate its principles of statutory interpretation and continue 
the judiciary’s pattern of broadly construing the Hobbs Act.260  In view of 
the plain and ordinary meaning of the Hobbs Act’s language, as well as the 
Act’s legislative history, the Supreme Court should affirm the Fourth 
Circuit and uphold Ocasio’s conviction.261 Important public policy 
considerations also militate in favor of a broad construction of the Hobbs 
Act as punishing co-conspirator extortion.262 Political corruption, 
particularly police corruption, has, is, and will continue to be, a provocative 
flashpoint for public discourse.263  Section 1951(b)(2) of the Hobbs Act 
provides the DOJ with a powerful weapon for punishing, and thereby 
deterring, corruption.264  A rule of law stemming from this case that gives 
teeth to the “under color of official right” clause of the Hobbs Act facilitates 
federal anti-corruption efforts, without unduly burdening judicial economy, 
or depriving local authorities of their site-based prerogatives.265 
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